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RECENT CASE NOTES
SALEs AcT-APPLICABILITY TO SALES op LESS THAN FrvE HUNDRED
DOLLARs-CoNSTIToIONALITY-The plaintiff entered into an oral contract
to sell certain cherry trees when sawed into lumber, at an agreed price of
$50 per thousand feet. He converted them into lumber and delivered them
to defendant's lumber yard. Defendant refused to pay for them, alleging
that he had contracted to buy 3,500 feet of select, clear cherry and that
the lumber delivered was not of this type. The jury found for the plaintiff,
the seller, and returned a verdict of $300. Defendant contended that the
contract was controlled by the Sales Act, but on appeal it was held that
the Sales Act did not apply because it is applicable only to sales of over
$500, the court citing Section 4, Acts of 1929, c. 192, page 628 at P. 629,
and that there was no evidence that this sale was $500 or more.
This would seem to be a unique application of the Sales Act, since there
is nothing in the statute itself which would limit it to sales over $500 and
there is no authority to that effect. Of course, there has been no consider-
able litigation under the Act involving sums under $500 for the obvious
and practical reason that people hesitate to bring actions for small sums.
However, there have been decisions under the Sales Act where the amounts
involved were less than $5002 and it is at least dubious whether the prin-
cipal case will be followed even in Indiana. Yet the decision of the court
is correct, because even though the Sales Act does apply in this transac-
tion, writing is by the Act not required unless the value amounts to $500
or upwards.
This is a contract to sell goods, but if it had been a contract to sell
choses in action, another interesting question would have arisen. So far
as concerns choses in action, the Indiana Sales Act is probably unconsti-
tutional, since the subject is not expressed in the title, "An Act relating
to the Sale of Goods." Section 19 of Article IV of the Indiana Constitution
provides that every "act shall embrace but one subject and matters prop-
erly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title.
But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed
in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not
be expressed in the title."
The purpose of this requirement has been variously expressed: "to
prevent surprise and to inform the people of the subject of the legisla-
tion,"3 "to prevent a combination of non-related subjects in the same
act,"4 "so that one reading it may at once understand the scope of the
act,"5 "to afford a fair index of the legislative intent, in case of ambiguity
in the context," 6 etc. Of course, the title need not be a complete index of
the body and mere generality of title is not objectionable, the act not
covering incongruous legislation without necessary or proper connection.7
lEddleman v. Myers (Feb. 15, 1934), 188 N. E. 802.
2Shohfi v. Rice (1922), 241 Mass. 211, 135 N. F. 141; Isaacs v. McDonald
(1913), 214 Mass. 487, 102 N. E. 8L
2 Crabbs v. The State (1923), 193 Ind. 248, 139 N. E. 180.
4 Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble (1929), 201 Ind. 88, 166 N. :9. 270.
Provident L. & T. Co. v. Hammond (1911), 230 Pa. 407, 79 AUt. 628.
Commonwealth v. Barney (1903), 24 Ky. L. P. 2352, 74 S. W. 181.
TCannon v. Mathes (1872), 56 Tenn. (8 Helsk.) 504; House v. Creveling
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It is clear that regardless of the propriety of such a constitutional pro-
vision, so long as it remains in effect,. "An Act relating to the Sale of
Goods" does not express the purpose of the Sales Act, within the meaning
of the constitution, if the provisions of that Act are to apply to sales of
choses in action.
Section 4 of the Sales Act reads, in part, "(1) A contract to sell or a
sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars
or upwards shall not be enforceable by action, etc."s The title of the Act,
as has been seen, mentions only "goods." If choses in action were intended
by the legislature to be included in that term, would Section 4 mention
"choses in action" in addition to it? Further, the definition of the term
"goods" as set forth in the Act itself, Section 76, specifically excludes
"choses in action." Thus the statute discloses its own ambiguity.
Under the constitutional provisions similar to our Section 19, it was
held in Pennsylvania that Section 4 of the Sales Act was unconstitutional
because it expressly includes choses in action which are not included in
the title, nor are they properly connected therewith.9 There the plaintiff
sought to recover because of defendant's refusal to comply with an oral
contract for the purchase of shares of corporate stock. The defendant
pleaded that the action was within Section 4. The plaintiff answered that
that section was unconstitutional and hence void. The court, after holding
that shares of stock in a corporation are choses in action,lO said, "Stock-
brokers and others buying and selling capital stock would hardly expect to
find in 'An Act relating to the Sale of Goods' a provision relating to the
sale of such stock. The question of constitutionality is not to be decided
by determining whether or not words of a particular title may be broad
enough to include a particular clause of the act, but whether or not the
statutory provision is 'clearly expressed in the title' so that one reading
it may at once understand the scope of the act."
As a result of this case, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Sales Act was
amended so as to satisfy the constitutional objection."1 The court pointed
out that the whole act might be unconstitutional as containing two sub-
jects, but this point was left undecided.
The constitutionality of this section has been attacked in other states
as class legislation, 12 which seems no serious contention, since the classifi-
cation is reasonable and proper, as having inadequate title because the
(1923), 147 Tenn. 589, 250 S. W. 357; Trainer v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 502, 154
N. B. 273; Volderauer v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 415, 143 N. E. 674; Baldwin v.
State (1923), 194 Ind. 303, 141 N. E. 343; White v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 63, 144
N. E. 531; Hobbs v. Gibson School Tp. of Washington County (1924), 195 Ind. 1,
144 N. E. 526.
a Section 13531.4 of Burns' Ann. St. 1929, the statute of frauds.
*Guppy v. Moltrup (1924), 281 Pa. 343, 126 A. 766.
'&The Pa. court cites P~oples' Bank v. Kurtz (1882), 99 Pa. 344, 44 Am. Rep.
112. The same principle was announced In Tisdale v. Harris (1838), 20 Pick.
(Mass.) 9; De Nunzlo v. De Nunzio (1916), 90 Conn. 342, 97 At. 323; Illinois-
Indiana Fair Assn. v. Phillips (1928), 328 Ill. 368, 159 N. B. 815; Culp v. Holbrook
(1920), 129 N. E. 278 (Ind. App.).
tBy Act of 1925, P. I. 310.
l3 Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie (1921), 270 Pa. 225, 113 At. 204; Common-
wealth v. Puder (1918), 261 Pa. 129, 104 A. 505; Laplaca v. Phila. R. T. Co.
(1919), 265 Pa. 304, 108 At. 612.
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$500 limitation is not expressed nor choses in action mentioned in the
tite.lS However, a Tennessee courtl 4 held that the title was sufficient,
being broad and general so that the exceptions (sales under $500) do not
invalidate it, and, further, that the provisions as to negotiable documents
of title were germane to the subject of sales and therefore not necessary
to be named in the title.
It would seem, therefore, that if the question of constitutionality were
brought before an Indiana court, the result would be the same as in Penn-
sylvania. Since there are thirty-one other states which have much the
same constitutional provision, one wonders that the question has not been
raised more often. M. C. M.
WITNESsES-CROSS EXAMINATION-IMPEACHmENT-The defendant was
on trial for rape; at this time there were other charges pending against
him in the same court. The defendant had taken the witness stand and
testified in his own behalf. On cross-examination he was asked the fol-
lowing question, "Are you the same A.P. that is charged in this court
with burglary and that charge is still standing against you?" The defend-
ant was compelled to answer this question after proper objection. The
question before the court on appeal was whether it is proper on cross-
examination to ask the defendant, who is being tried on a particular charge,
if he has not been arrested or indicted on other charges distinct from
the one he is on trial for, or to so frame the question as to be equivalent
in meaning to the above question. Held: No. Reversed.1
This case resolves the doubt which has surrounded the question of
whether for the purposes of impeaching the credibility of the witness he
may be interrogated on cross-examination as to prior arrests, indictments,
and prosecutions for crimes, or as to convictions for crimes only.2 The
statutes in Indiana on the point are broad; the two statutes on the point
read as follows: "Any fact that might heretofore be shown to render
the witness incompetent may be shown to affect his credibility," and "In
all questions affecting the credibility of the witness his general character
may be given in evidence."3 The cases decided under this statutes are
not strictly in accord; the earlier cases leaning toward the rule that past ar-
rests and indictments could not be inquired into to affect the credibility of a
witness.4 However, the later cases generally followed the rule that it
was in the sound discretion of the trial court to allow such question to
be asked.5 The principal case expressly overruled two prior decisionss
s Petty v. Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. (1924). 150 Tenn. 292, 264 S. W. 353.
2A Ibid.
'Petro v. State (1933), Supreme Court of Indiana, 184 N. E. 710.
W igrnore, Law of Evidence (1923. 2nd ed.), Vol. II, p. 392; Watson's Re-
vision of Work's Practice and Forms (1921). Vol. I, sec. 1495.
$Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, sec. 560.
'Glenn v. Glose (1873), 42 Ind. 60; Farley v. State (1887), 57 Ind. 331, 337;
Canada v. Curry (1881), 73 Ind. 246.
5 City of South Bend v. Hardy (1884), 98 Ind. 527; Spencer v. Robbins (1886),
106 Ind. 580, 5 N. E. 726; Parker v. State (1893), 136 Ind. 284, 35 N. E. 1105;
Stalcup v. State (1896), 146 Ind. 270, 45 N. E. 334; Ellis v. State (1898), 153 Ind.
331, 52 N. E. 82; Dunn v. State (1904), 162 Ind. 174, 70 N. E. 521; Enock v. State
(1907), 169 Ind. 488, 82 N. E. 1039; Crum v. State (1897), 148 Ind. 401, 47 N. B.
